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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LEE W. HOBBS, as Administrator with Will
Annexed of the Estate of JOSEPH
BUHLER, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
12105

ETHEL JEANNE BUHLER FENTON and
JAMES E. FENTON,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, as administrator with Will annexed
of the estate of Joseph Buhler, deceased, seeks to
have certain stock certificates and bank accounts
which at the time of decedent's death were in the
name of Joseph Buhler and respondent, as joint
tenants, declared property of the estate of the deceased and further requiring respondent to account
to the estate for any and all property in respondent's
Possession which was held in joint tenancy by respondent and decedent.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Sal\
Lake County, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson presiding, entered a decree (R. 26) in favor of respond
ent and against appellant finding that respondenl
was the sole owner of the property, that appellan!
had no right, title, estate or interest in any of the
property and that the complaint of appellant be dis·
missed with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Decree dated
the 13th day of April, 1970, and a direction from the
Court that the properties were in fact held by re·
spondent in trust for the deceased and his estate, or,
in the alternative, for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to the taking of testimony, the trial court
accepted a stipulation of the parties which establish·
ed for the record certain uncontested facts. The stip·
ulation provided that Joseph Buhler, hereinafter referred to as decedent, died testate on the 3rd day
of March, 1968, and at the time of his death was a
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 40).
That on the 4th day of December, 1968, a Will ex·
ecuted by the deceased on the 15th day of Decem·
ber, 1961, was admitted to probate and appellant
was named as administrator with Will annexed (R.
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41). That on the 13th day of December, 1968, appellant demanded from respondent certain itemized
stock certificates together with a $400.00 checking
account maintained with the Walker Bank &
Trust Company. Appellant also demanded an
accounting covering any other property that decedent had placed in decedent and respondent's
name (R. 41). The stipulation further provided that
all of decedent's property was so arranged that no
property, other than an uncollected Judgment recovered by decedent against W. E. Maddison,
existed to be probated should respondent prevail
in the instant action (R. 42, 112).
Appellant does not desire to unduly burden
this Court with an unnecessary recitation of the
testimony as developed at the trial. However, because this case involves the difficult task of interpreting the intentions and desires of the decedent,
and also requires a judgment as to the relationship
that existed between a father and his children, appellant will briefly summarize the testimony.
The following witnesses testified on behalf of
appellant. Mr. Ray George Buhler, a son of decedent, testified that the relationship between the
witness and his father was close and typical of a
father-son association (R. 44); that the witness observed no show of favoritism between his father and
the children (R. 44-48); that his father advised him
that the financial arrangement existing between
decedent and respondent was for convenience and
that respondent would settle decedent's affairs
with the family after his death (R. 46); that Exhibits
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1-P and 2-P were simultaneously sent to the witness
by his father (R. 46, 47); that his father advised him
that respondent had a "power of attorney" to
handle decedent's affairs after he passed on, for
the rest of the family (R. 50, 51).

Mr. Mac William Buhler, also a son of decedent,
testified that he was very close to his father (R. 53);
that the witnesse' s adopted son was named after
decedent (R. 54); that the decedent had executed
a Will and forwarded a copy thereof to each child
(R. 57, Exhibit 2P); that in 1963 decedent advised
each child that they would receive equal shares
of his estate, minus credits for previous loans advanced by decedent (R. 58, 59).
Norma Lorraine Buhler Reese, a daughter of
decedent, testified that decedent lived with her for
scbstantial periods of time after his divorce (R. 64);
that she did his laundry (R. 64) and, for a certain
period of time, donated her employment check to
decedent (R. 66); that even after decedent had purchased a home, he would bathe at her home because his home was not equipped with adequate
plumbing fixtures (R. 68); that decedent had suffered several physical ailments which prompted
the joint tenancy arrangement between deceased
and respondent (R. 73); that his estate was to be
divided equally between the children (Exhibit 4-P,
R. 73, 75).
Chester L. Reese, the husband of Norma Lorraine Buhler Reese, testified that deceased had ad-
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vised him that if any child died, the children of the
deceased child would share in the deceased child's
portion of the estate R. 93).
Mr. James E. Fenton, husband of respondent,
testified that, as a stock broker, he handled decedent's investments and that the investments were
for the purposes of acquiring income and accumulating savings (R. 96); that decedent began putting
his stock in joint tenancy with respondent in 1954
(R. 96); that decedent purchased the stock in his
own name and thereafter issued or transferred the
stocks to the joint tenancy arrangement (R. 97); that
respondent never contributed to the funds which
purchased the stock (R. 97); that the stock was the
sole property of deceased (R. 97); that respondent
never gained possession of the stock certificates,
acknowledged receipt of delivery of the stock certificates or ever had possession of the bank account
(R. 95, 97, 98 and 101); that decedent authorized respondent to sign the checks (R. 101); that all expenditures by respondent were for the benefit of
decedent (R. 102); that respondent never exercised
control or dominion over the stock certificates, the
bank account or asserted any claim of ownership
in the property (R. 102, 103 and 119).
The deposition of Irene Warr, a Salt Lake City
attorney, was also published and made part of the
record by appellant. According to the deposition,
Miss Warr had a discussion with Mr. James E. Fenton on the 21st day of July, 1964, regarding decedent's financial condition and status (R. 128); that
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Mr. Fenton advised Miss Warr that there was no
need for the appointment of a guardian and tha1
when decedent died, they (The Fentons) would
make an accounting and distribution of the remaining estate to the family (R. 129, 130); that based on
these representations, Miss Warr advised Mrs.
Reese that there would be no need for a guardianship (R. 132); that at the time of this discussion with
Mr. Fenton, there was no mention of any join!
tenancy arrangement between decedent and respondent (R. 134).
The following witnesses testified on behalf of
respondent. Mr. T. Quentin Cannon, a Salt Lake
City attorney, testified that in 1955 he advised de·
cedent to put the deed to decedent's home in join!
tenancy (R. 87); hat he explained the cost of probate
as against joint tenancy disposition of property to
decedent (R. 86); that he didn't describe the effect
joint tenancy as affectively disinheriting the other
four children to decedent (R. 89); that decedent
wanted respondent to have the property.
Francis L. Buhler, a brother of deceased, testified that on I une 14, 1961, he caused to have certain
stock certificates transferred into joint tenancy between decedent and respondent (R. 141); that at
this time, decedent also advised the witness as to
the existance of a Will executed by decedent (R.
141).
Mrs. Bonnie Routh, a sister of deceased, testified that approximately ten years ago, she had a
discussion with decedent wherein he stated tha1
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he wanted the property to go to respondent. However, there was no discussion as to the other four
children (R. 143).
Helen H. Buhler, the former wife of decedent's
eldest son, testified that decedent wanted the property to go to respondent (R. 148); that she knew nothing of any Will acually executed by decedent or
with whom decedent lived after his divorce (R. 149).
The extent of the testimony given by respondent was that, with respect to a telephone call from
Miss Irene Warr, she advised Miss Warr that she
had no details about decedent's financial status and
she would have to refer Miss Warr to her husband,
Mr. Fenton (R. 152).
During his lifetime, decedent executed several
Wills which were introduced into evidence as Exhibits 2-P, 4-P and 6-P. The last Will of decedent,
Exhibit 6-P, was prepared by respondent's husband,
Mr. Fenton, who also took decedent to his place of
business where the Will was executed and witnessed (R. 104).
Appellant submits that while the above summary is necessary to understand the intent and desire of decedent, one Exhibit reflects this in decedent' s own handwriting and words. A portion of
a letter written by decedent to his son, Ray, dated
the 5th day of June, 1961, reads as follows:
. . . and am sending you my will, so you will
have it when I pass from this life to the be-on;
now don't get upset about the claws, in the
will about the three hundred dollars, which

'
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will be deducted from your inheritance, from
my will; So you see, you have got that amount
already and $60.00 dollars more, which is not
taken off. Now you have got that amount of
$360.00 dollars and have had the use of it for
more than ten years; So you are not going to
lose any thing of the Estate, you will be getting $60.00 more than the rest of your Brothers
and Sister. (Exhibit 1-P)

Appellant respectfully submits that the above
quoted letter accurately reflects the state-of-mind of
decedent with respect to the distribution of his
estate and also settles any question of his relationship with his children.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IS CREATED IN
FAVOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DONOR WHEN A
JOINT TENANCY ARRANGEMENT VESTS NO RIGHT,
INTEREST OR CLAIM IN THE OTHER JOINT
TENANT AND THE PURPOSE OF THE ARRANGE·
MENT IS TO AVOID PROBATE OF THE DONOR'S
ESTATE.

Appellant immediately recognizes his burden
of proof in attempting to impose on the property
presently in respondent's possession a constructive
trust for the benefit of decedent's estate. As stated
by this Court in Tangren vs. Ingells, 12 Utah 2d 388, 394,
367 P. 2nd 179 (1961):
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... where there is a written agreement of joint
tenancy with right of survivorship there is a
presumption of validity and it will be given
effect unless it is successfully attacked for
fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity,
or unless it is shown by clear and convincing
evidence that the parties intended otherwise ...
(Emphasis added.)

Appellant respectfully submits that the evidence adduced at the trial of the instant matter
clearly and convincingly established that the decedent did not intend to create a legitimate joint
tenancy between decedent and respondent and,
further, that the acts and conduct of respondent
dictate the conclusion that she understood decedent's intentions to be something other than the
creation of a valid joint tenancy arrangement.
The rule pronounced in Tangren vs. Ingells, supra,
with respect to the critical question being the intent
of the parties, is consistant with the holding of
Braedzer vs. Loveland, 12 Utah 2d 384, 367 P2d 177 (1961),
wherein this court stated at 12 Utah 2d 385:
In any contest over the owenrship of funds in
such an account, the objective is to determine
where the true ownership is, and this in turn
often depends upon what the intent was in
creating the account.

In assertaining the intent of the parties, all material factors should be considered. After a careful
review of the evidence, it cannot be seriously said
that decedent intended to vest in respondent a
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right, interest or claim of ownership in either the
stock certificates or the bank account.
Several witnesses testified that the creation of
the joint tenancy arrangement was for decedent's
convenience and to eliminate decedent's apprehension that, should he become incapacitated, he
would also become dependent on others to merely
exist. It was also clear from the evidence that decedent was not the type of individual to tolerate
dependence on anyone, for any reason.
This conclusion is further supported by the
testimony of respondent's husband, Mr. James E.
Fenton, who candidly admitted that the investments
made by decedent were for the purpose of acquiring an independent income and accumulating savings for decedent's future use and benefit (R. 96).
At no time did decedent intend respondent to be
on an equal parity with respect to the benefits produced by the investments. The immediate income
through dividends and the cultivation of a substantial portfolio were strictly subject to decedent's control and direction. This is further borne out by the
acts and conduct of respondent, which will be discussed in more detail at a subsequent point in this
brief.
Continuing with an analysis of decedent's intent, it is obvious that the cost of probate of a remaining estate was a supreme concern to decedent.
The previously referred to testimony of T. Quentin
Cannon aptly substantiates this as illustrated by the
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following exchange that occurred during cross-examination:
Q.

(By Mr. Frank) Was he (the deceased)
concerned with what probate might entail?

A.

That is not with probate, the cost of it.

Q.

The cost of it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And also the length of time involved in
probate?

A.

No, sir, he was concerned about money.
(R.

88)

In decedent's frame of mind, identical results
would be reached whether his estate was probated
or left to respondent, as a joint tenant, with the full
although misplaced belief that respondent would
make an accounting and distribution to the rest of
the family after decedent's death. This is obviously
what decedent intended.
However, this intent of decedent is in direct
conflict with the rule announced by this court in
Culley vs. Culley, 17 Utah 2d 62, 404 P2d 657 (1965),
wherein this court stated at 17 Utah 2d 36:
It is to be kept in mind that if the transfer of
the ownership of this account, if any there was,
was intended to vest only upon the father's
death, that would be an attempted testimentary disposition which did not conform to the
requisits for a Will, and would therefore be
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invalid to transfer ownership as the trial court
ruled.

Therefore, the attempted joint tenancy transfer
in the instant matter must be held void and the
property in respondent's possession deemed impressed with a constructive trust for the benefit of
decedent's estate.
Further, the execution of Exhibits 2-P, 4-P and
6-P, by decedent would have no assertainable
meaning if respondent's position was sustained. Decedent had been advised in 1955 by legal counsel
that a will and a subsequent probate would be unnecessary if the joint tenancy arrangement was
consummated. However, on several occasions after
this date, decedent saw fit to indicate his intentions
by and through the execution of these various wills.
At the trial, respondent took the position that the
only property to be disposed of by the referred to
wills was an uncollected Judgment recovered by
decedent against one W. E. Maddison. This argument is clearly facetious in light of the wording of
the wills, which provide for the distribution of,
" ... all property, personal, real or mixed and including any settlement realized from the court
judgment for $18,000.00 awarded to me against W.
E. Maddison, to my children as follows . . . " (Exhibit 6-P).
Finally decedent in his own handwriting, and
words expressed his intent as to the distribution of
his esta,te in Exhibit 1-P, a portion of which has
been previously quoted by appellant in this brief.
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In considering the intent and understanding of
respondent, several circumstances should be noted.
It is admitted that at no time did respondent contribute to any of the funds utilized to make the stock
purchases or which constituted the checking account with Walker Bank & Trust Company (R. 97).
Further, respondent asserted no claim of ownership to any of the property during the lifetime of
decedent. Because of the importance of this fact,
appellant would direct the court's attention to the
following questions propounded to Mr. James E.
Fenton, husband of respondent, and Mr. Fenton's
responses thereto:
Q.

(By Mr. Frank) So what it boils down
to, Mr. Fenton, is that although the stocks
and the bank accounts were in the joint
names of your father-in-law and your wife,
your wife never assumed any control over
them, did she, except for his use and benefit?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

(Mr. Frank) I take it from what you
have said, and the total scope of your
testimony, your wife asserted no claim of
ownership to either the bank accounts of
stock until after the death of your fatherin-law, is this correct?

A.

That is correct.

*

*

*

Respondent's total lack of any claim, interest or
right in the joint tenancy property is further il-
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lustrated by the fact that authority from decedent
was obtained before checks on the joint checking
account were executed by respondent (R. 101). Had
the joint tenancy arrangement been legitimate and
effective, no such authority would be needed. See
Exhibit 11-D, which sets forth the joint tenancy
agreement between the parties and the bank.
The evidence clearly indicates that the requirements necessary to create a joint tenancy were not
present nor intended by the parties to this arrangement. As stated in 20 Am. Jur. 2d sec. 4, page 96:
. . . the tenants must have one and the same
interest; the interest must accrue by one and
the same conveyance; they must commence
at one and the same time; and the property
must be held by one and the same underwrited
possession. In other words, there must be the
following four unities: (1) unity of interest,
(2) unity of title, (3) unity of time, (4) unity
of possession.

Although the above mentioned four unities are
not requisits to joint tenancy bank accounts, Hanks vs.
Hales, 17 Utah 2d 344, 411P2d836 (1966), the requirements obviously apply to the stock certificates in
that the issuance or trans£er of ownership in stock
certificates is not a question of contract such as that
involved in the creation of a joint tenancy bank account.
A further indication of the understanding of respondent of the joint tenancy arrangement is found
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in the deposition of Miss Irene Warr which sets
forth the discussion between Miss Warr and James
E. Fenton, in July, 1964. At the trial and during the
course of the deposition, respondent objected to
this conversation on the grounds that it was hearsay evidence. However, appellant submits that the
record clearly indicates that Mr. Fenton visited Miss
Warr at respondent's direction and request. This is
the substance of Mr. Fenton's testimony (R. 105, 106)
and respondent also testified that she advised Miss
Warr that she had no details concerning decedent's
financial condition or status and that Miss Warr
would have to talk to Mr. Fenton (R. 152).
As stated in 2 Jones on Evidence, sec. 356, page
670 (1958):
If a party to a proceeding expressly refers to
another person as being one whom he has im-

powered to answer on a particular subject in
dispute, the answer given is in general evidence against him for the reason that he
makes such third party his accredited agent for
the purpose of giving the answer.

Also, this court states in Jones vs. Allen, 7 Utah 2d
79, 85, 318 P2d 637 (1957):
If a party, instead of expressing his belief in

his own words, names another person as one
whose expected utterances he approves beforehand this amounts to an anticipatory adoption
of that person's statement; and it becomes,
when made, the parties own.
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As the record indicates, Mr. Fenton did not advise Miss Warr as to the existance of the joint
tenancy arrangement and, further, states that on decedent's death, an accounting and distribution of
the remaining estate would be made to the rest of
the family (R. 129, 130 and 132). Based on this conversation, Miss Warr advised Mrs. Reese, a daughter of decedent, that a guardianship was not necessary, that decedent was financially secure and that
distribution would be forthcoming.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the trial court disregarded the
clear and convincing evidence. Neither party to the
joint tenancy arrangement intended respondent to
have any right, interest or claim of ownership in
the subject property until decedent's death. The
rational of Culley vs. Culley, supra, should be applied
to render the trans£er void and impress on the property presently in the possession of respondent a
constructive trust for the use and benefit of decedent's estate.
Respectfully submitted:
RICHARDS & RICHARDS
Gary A. Frank
Edward F. Richards
Attorneys for Appellant
900 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

